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Quality of record linkage in a highly automated cancer
registry that relies on encrypted identity data
Zur Güte des Record Linkage mit verschlüsselten Identitätsdaten in
einem weitgehend automatisierten Krebsregister
Abstract
Objectives: In the absence of unique ID numbers, cancer and other
registries in Germany and elsewhere rely on identity data to link records
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Ziel der Arbeit: Krankheitsregister in Deutschland und einigen anderen
Ländern sind darauf angewiesen, mehrereMeldungen zu einem Patien-
National de Santé,
Luxembourg, Luxembourg
ten anhand von Identitätsdaten zusammenzuführen, da keine eindeu-
tige Personenkennung verfügbar ist. Diese Identitätsdaten werden
häufig aus Datenschutzgründen pseudonymisiert. Einige Fehler beim
Record Linkage sind unvermeidbar. In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden
sie für das Epidemiologische Krebsregister Nordrhein-Westfalen, das
chiffrierte Identitätsdaten zumRecord Linkage verwendet, quantifiziert.
Methoden: Eine Stichprobe von Meldungen an das Epidemiologische
Krebsregister Nordrhein-Westfalen, die mit der Information über die
Zuordnung zu einer Person versehen war, wurde gezogen. Parallel dazu
wurden Klartextidentitätsdaten für diese Meldungen durch Dechiffrie-
rung wiedergewonnen, um einen Gold-Standard zu erzeugen. Die Zuord-
nungsfehlerhäufigkeiten wurden durch Vergleich der Ergebnisse des
Routine-Record Linkage mit dem Gold-Standard bestimmt. Die Fehler-
raten wurden für umfangreichere Register hochgerechnet.





































































Ergebnisse: In der untersuchten Stichprobe betrug die Homonymfehler-
rate 0.015%, die Synonymfehlerrate 0.2%, das F-Maß ergab 0.9921.
Eine Hochrechnung auf umfangreichere Datenbanken ergab, dass bei
realistischenAnnahmenüber die ZunahmedesUmfangs eineHomonym-
fehlerrate von etwa 1% und eine Synonymfehlerrate von etwa 2% zu
erwarten sind.
Schlussfolgerung: Die beobachteten Fehlerraten sind niedrig, darin
zeigt sich, dass effektiveMethoden zur Standardisierung und Sicherung
der Datenqualität implementiert wurden. Dies ist essenziell, damit die
Fehlerraten niedrig bleiben, wenn der Umfang des Registers zunimmt.
Durch den geplanten Einschluss der eindeutigen Krankenversicherungs-
nummer ist eine weitere Verbesserung der Güte des Record Linkage
zu erwarten. Krebsregistrierung, die allein auf elektronischeMeldungen
basiert, kann große Datenmengen verarbeiten bei hoher Qualität des
Record Linkage.
Schlüsselwörter: Record Linkage, Krebsregister, Evaluierung,
verschlüsselte Daten, Datenqualität
Introduction
In Germany, no unique identity number can be used for
linking records in cancer registries. Personal identity data
must be used instead. To protect identity data, registries
store them only in encrypted form and record linkage is
performed exclusively using encrypted identifiers. The
basic principles of this cancer registration model have
been described before [1].
The population based cancer registry of North Rhine
Westphalia (Epidemiologisches Krebsregister NRW, short
EKR NRW) is one of the most recent German registries
having been in operation since July 2005. By law, it reg-
isters all cases of cancer in the German federal state of
North Rhine Westphalia (NRW), covering a population of
almost 18 million [2]. The registration scheme builds on
previous experience gained locally in the former cancer
registry for theMünster region and in Germany in general
since the 1990s. The Münster cancer registry was incor-
porated into the new registry in 2005. One distinctive
feature of the EKR NRW is that cases are notified to the
cancer registry exclusively electronically, using secure
data transmission. Another distinctive feature is that the
software for stochastic record linkage, based on the
Fellegi-Sunter model [3] and implementing the German
standard for record linkage in cancer registries [4], is in-
tegrated in the registry’s database system developed by
the EKRNRW itself. In this study, we investigate the actual
accuracy of the record linkage procedures used in this
cancer registry.
Scientific background
The most common methods used for record linkage are
stochastic methods; their main feature is to assign
probability-based weights to pairs of records. These
weights are derived from the probabilities of record
agreement given that the records in a pair pertain to one
person or to two persons. A high weight corresponds to
a high probability that the two underlying records repre-
sent the same person. Two thresholds are chosen such
that record pairs with weights exceeding the first
threshold are considered to pertain to one person; record
pairs with weights below the second threshold are as-
sumed to represent two persons [3]. Pairs of records with
weights between the two thresholds are marked for a
clerical review. If both thresholds are equal, record linkage
can be fully automatized.
One important issue when performing record linkage is
to minimize both homonym and synonym errors. Hom-
onym errors occur if records are erroneously linked (false
positives); this leads to underestimation of the true
number of cases [5]. When linking cancer registry records
with death certificates, homonym errors cause overesti-
mation of mortality [6]. Synonym errors occur if records
are erroneously not matched although they pertain to
one person (false negatives) resulting in overestimation
of the true number of cases and underestimation of
mortality. Therefore, it is necessary that record linkage
in a cancer registry minimizes the amount of errors,
thereby enabling unbiased estimation of epidemiological
measures.
Previous investigations on record linkage with encrypted
data in the former Münster cancer registry found hom-
onym errors to be 0.5% and synonym errors to be 2% [7].
This is generally considered as being sufficiently low
(<<5%), i.e. incidence and survival estimates of such a
registry are approximately unbiased.
Objectives of study
The laws governing the EKR NRW stipulate that it has to
evaluate its procedures [2]. We report on the evaluation
of the record linkage procedures, as conducted by an in-
dependent evaluation group.
The objective of this study was to determine the frequency
of record linkage errors in the EKRNRW, thereby providing
insights into the quality of stochastic record linkage in a
real-world application with iterative insertions into a large
database. We project the results to an ever-increasing
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database because homonym error rates increase with
the size of the cancer registry and synonym error rates
increase with the number of records per person [8].
Notification process and record linkage
in the EKR NRW
At the time of evaluation, the EKR NRW received notific-
ations of incident cancer cases from physicians directly
and from the oncological quality assurance databases.
Further, pathology laboratories provided pathology re-
ports, and death records were obtained for mortality fol-
low-up from population registers. Specialized software
has been made available for physicians to notify cancer
cases to the EKR NRW.
1. Each new case entered by a physician receives a
unique record ID derived from the sequence number,
an ID unique to the notifying person or body (e.g.
physician or hospital department), and a time-stamp.
This unique record ID (URID) is used to link separately
transmitted portions of data relating to the same no-
tification. Records are processed as follows (see Fig-
ure 1).
Figure 1: Encryption data flow [29]
2. Part of the patient identity information to be used for
record linkage is not allowed to be stored in plaintext
(P1: first name, family name, former names, day of
birth; street and house number of residence), another
part must be kept in plain text (P2: sex, month and
year of birth, zip code and place of residence).
Part P1 is encrypted in two ways, first as a single string
using an asymmetric encryption algorithm. This en-
crypted information, the plain text identifiers (P2), the
epidemiological tumor data (ED), and the unique re-
cord ID are transmitted to the cancer registry directly.
The asymmetric key pair was generated by an external
trusted authority, namely the Medical Association
(ÄrztekammerWestfalen-Lippe) which also safeguards
the private key. Data are encrypted using the “public”
key and can be only decrypted using the private key.
The encrypted information is stored to allow for pos-
sible future decryption (such as the present study),
but is not used for record linkage.
3. In the second encryption, pseudonyms (P1_PSN) for
each individual component of the identity information
P1 are generated; the principle has been described
in [9]: Names are partitioned into components (up to
three per name), a phonetic algorithm [10] is applied
to the components. Using the MD5 hash algorithm
hashed versions of each ID variable (P1_IK) are ob-
tained. Following this step, the ID hashes and the
unique record ID are transmitted to a pseudonymiza-
tion service which is provided by the regional Associ-
ation of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians
(Kassenärztliche VereinigungWestfalen-Lippe). There,
they are encrypted into a pseudonyms (P1_PSN) using
a symmetric key, which is only known to the pseud-
onymization service. This symmetrical encryption
largely prevents “dictionary based” decryption at-
tempts.
4. The pseudonymization service transmits the unique
record ID and pseudonyms (P1_PSN) to the EKRNRW.
5. EKR NRW merges plain text personal identifiers P2,
the epidemiological data EDand pseudonymsP1_PSN
using the unique record ID, thereby re-assembling the
separately transmitted portions of each notification.
Notifications from oncological quality assurance data-
bases are processed in batch. However, the data fields
transmitted to the cancer registry and encryption proced-
ure are identical.
Every night, new notifications are linked to the registry
database. Stochastic record linkage is performed using
software developed within the EKR NRW using SQL Win-
dows on a SQLBase database. The algorithm described
in [4] which is the standard for German cancer registries
has been implemented. Matching variables are: sex, ad-
ministrational code of place of residence, month and year
of birth in plain text and pseudonyms based on the vari-
ables surname, given name, and name at birth, and day
of birth. Frequency attacks using publicly available inform-
ation about the frequency distribution of identifiers as
described in [11] are unlikely to be successful here be-
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cause the frequency distribution of identifiers of cancer
patients is different from that of the general population
but unknown to the cancer registry staff. Furthermore,
strong organizational measures are in place to prevent
attacks that are conceivable in theory.
In order to avoid comparing every new record with every
other record in the database, which would result in many
unnecessary comparisons, “blocking” is applied, where
a set of “blocking variables” must match perfectly
between two records in order that pairs of records are
compared. Seven passes with different sets of blocking
variables are performed. Pseudonyms (denoted by PSN(·))
and plain text blocking variables in each pass are
1. PSN(phonetic code of surname), PSN(phonetic code
of given name), PSN(day of birth), month of birth, year
of birth;
2. PSN(phonetic code of surname), sex, administrational
code of place of residence;
3. PSN(phonetic code of given name), PSN(day of birth);
4. PSN(phonetic code of given name), month of birth;
5. PSN(phonetic code of given name), year of birth;
6. PSN(day of birth), month of birth, year of birth;
7. PSN(phonetic code of surname).
Pairs of records above an upper threshold are linked
automatically; pairs of records below a lower threshold
are not linked. Matching thresholds have been adapted
over time. The remaining records are subjected to clerical
review. This is based on tables containing the pseudo-
nyms for first name, family name, former names, day of
birth, and the identifiers available in plain text (sex, month
and year of birth, zip code and place of residence). For
each pseudonym a single letter is displayed such that
identical pseudonyms have the same letters. Further, all
diagnostic information from the compared records and
the matching weights is shown.
Besides blocking, qualitative linkage rules are applied:
new records referring to a living patient are never linked
to records that refer to deceased patients who died at
least three months before the diagnosis of the new case.
Further, records referring to patients whose death oc-
curred at least five years before the current data are ex-
cluded from record linkage with new notifications.
Materials and methods
Study design
To ensure confidentiality and neutrality, the evaluation
was performed by an independent evaluation group at
the University Medical Center in Mainz. No EKR NRW
personnel had access to the study datasets. A sample of
cancer registry records was drawn from the EKR NRW. A
dataset containing non-encrypted identity data was ob-
tained and used to generate a gold standard to which the
results of the record linkage of the EKR NRW were com-
pared.
Data acquisition
In September 2008 the EKRNRWdrew a randomsample
of 100,000 records of patients notified to the registry
from 2006 onwards, subject to the constraint that 50%
of the records should be notifications from pathologists,
35% from oncological quality assurance and 15% general
notifications of incident cases. Further, the EKR NRW
provided 50,000 death notifications which it had received
from population registers. 11.2% of these death notifica-
tions had been linked in the EKR NRW to cases in the
random sample of notifications. This reflects the contri-
butions of the different sources to the cancer registry and
the proportion of death notifications linked to registered
cases at the time of the evaluation.
The EKR NRW generated a unique sequence number for
each record in the sample. It forwarded epidemiological
data and sequence numbers to the evaluation group and
sent the sequence numbers and encrypted ID data to the
external trusted authority. The trusted authority decrypted
patient identifiers and transmitted plain text patient
identity data and sequence number to the evaluation
group, which recombined epidemiological data and pa-
tient identity using the sequence number.
Permission for this decryption and data transmission had
been obtained from data protection agencies. All data
transmissions either took place within a restricted safe
network environment or using additional transport encryp-
tion. At no time plain text patient identity data were
available to anybody outside the evaluation group. Per-
sons involved with plain text data in the clerical review
of the record linkage were obliged to ensure strict confi-
dentiality.
The variables contained in the database were as follows:
• unique sequence number
• identity data: surname, first name, title, name at birth
(maiden name), other previous name, sex, date of birth
(day, month, year), address (street, number, post code,
place of residence), nationality
• in the case of deceased patients: date of death, place
of death, cause of death, vital records office registering
the death
• medical information: date of diagnosis, tumor diagno-
sis (ICD-10 code), morphology and site (ICD-0-3 codes)
• a unique Person ID assigned to all records pertaining
to one person as identified by EKR NRW
Generating the gold standard
The data then were subjected to data cleansing and
preprocessing. Inconsistent spelling of places of residence
was detected and corrected, additions to names and to
places of residence were removed, obvious errors typical
for automatically scanned documents (e. g. “5” instead
of “S”) were corrected. Similar to the routines described
above, names were separated in up to three parts. Fur-
ther, phonetic codes (Kölner Phonetik, similar to the
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Figure 2: Record linkage results represented as graphs. Nodes represent records, matches correspond to edges. Solid edges
represent matches in the gold standard; dotted edges represent matches determined in the EKR NRW. Left: four records
pertaining to two persons that were considered pertaining to one person in the cancer registry (homonym error). Right: three
records for one person that were considered as two records for one person and one record for another person (synonym error).
Soundex algorithm, butmore suitable for German names)
[9] were generated for all name components.
As a next step, a gold standard of links was created using
three stochastic record linkage software packages based
on the Fellegi-Sunter model [3], i.e. Automatch 4.3 [12],
MTB 0.61 [13], and a stochastic record linkage based on
an EM algorithm as implemented in the R-package Re-
cordLinkage [14], [15], [16]. Each method was applied
to find duplicates among the cancer notifications (de-
duplication) and pairs of matching incident cases and
death certificates (matching).
The primary purpose of using several record linkage pro-
grams and several string distancemeasureswas to obtain
different decision boundaries. These were combined in
order to safeguard decisions concerning matches, non-
matches and a comprehensive dataset for the clerical
review of possible matches.
A blocking strategy was devised using the different com-
binations of “blocking variables”. The subsets of blocking
variables were chosen such that no single variable was
contained in all sets of blocking variables, thus allowing
for errors in each variable. For the linkage with Automatch
and MTB, ten passes with different sets of blocking vari-
ables were used, i.e.
1. Phonetic code surname, Phonetic code given name,
Day of birth, Month of birth, Year of birth;
2. Phonetic code surname, Day of birth, Month of birth,
Year of birth;
3. Phonetic code surname, Sex, Post code;
4. Phonetic code surname, Sex, Place of residence;
5. Day of birth, Month of birth, Year of birth, Place of
residence;
6. Phonetic code given name, Day of birth;
7. Phonetic code given name, Month of birth;
8. Phonetic code given name, Year of birth;
9. Day of birth, Month of birth, Year of birth;
10. Phonetic code surname, Sex.
The blocking strategies for the method using the EM-al-
gorithm had been formulated independendly; therefore
only passes 1, 5–8, 10 were applied. The matching vari-
ables were first name, family name, sex, day, month and
year of birth, zip code. They were used in all passes and
with all methods. When generating the gold standard, the
blocking strategy differed from the strategy applied in the
EKR NRW. The administrational code was not contained
in the transmitted data; therefore, two passes were used,
replacing the administrational code with post code and
place of residence respectively. Pass 2 was added and
sex was added in the last pass to reduce the number of
overly large blocks that could not be processed by Auto-
match.
When linking the data with Automatch, a positive weight
was only assigned when exact agreement with respect
to a matching variable was observed. When linking data
with MTB we used exact agreement, Levenshtein
Damerau distance [17], [18] and bigrams [19]; in the
method using an EM-algorithm fuzzy matches were also
used [20].
Each program’s output consisted of pairs of record num-
bers and a weight that was classified as “certain match”,
“potential match” or “non-match”. The weights computed
by the record linkage software were based on the Fellegi-
Sunter model [3]; thresholds were determined after in-
spection of the results. The single records can be repres-
ented as nodes of an undirected graph; and matches
correspond to edges connecting these nodes. The con-
nected components of this graph are the records that
possibly pertain to the same person (Figure 2).
All 15,146 groups of records that were identified as
possibly pertaining to one person by at least one of the
programs were included in a clerical review, amounting
to a total of 34,633 records. There were few differences
between the three programs in the pairs of records that
were identified as possible matches. The EM-algorithm
with Levenshtein distance found at most 5 records more
per pass – amounting to 0.0007% overall [21].
The identity data were supplemented by date of diagnosis,
date of death and diagnosis (ICD code). Difficult decisions
were discussed in the group of reviewers. The decisions
resulting from the clerical review were entered into a
database and comparedwith the cancer registry decision;
in some cases the decision was revised. A sample of
4,000 pairs of records that had received low matching
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weights and had automatically been classified as non-
matches for the gold standard also was reviewed.
We then compared the results of EKR NRW’s record
linkage to our gold standard by comparing the number
of persons and the number of records (notifications)
identified as pertaining to each person.
In order to assess the quality of the record linkage and
to compare the results of the current study to previous
investigations on record linkage quality, we computed
homonym and synonym error rates. Denote by NH the
number of homonyms, NS the number of synonyms, NG
the number of persons in the gold standard, and NGP the
number of persons in the gold standard with more than
one record. The homonym error rate is given by H=NH/NG.
The synonym error rates are S1=NS/NG and S2=NS/ NGP.
Whereas S1 measures the effect of synonym errors on
the cancer registry, S2measures the quality of the record
linkage procedure. We further computed precision (posi-
tive predictive value) prec=(true matches/(true matches
+ homonyms)) and recall (sensitivity) rec=(true
matches/(truematches + synonyms)) and the F-measure
F=2(prec*rec)/(prec+rec) [22]. The relative net error
ne=(NS-NH)/NG measures the impact of record linkage er-
rors on epidemiological measures.
Projection to larger databases
The homonym and synonym error rates depend on the
number of records in the registry, the number of records
per case, the probability of erroneously linking unrelated
records and the probability of erroneously not linking re-
cords pertaining to the same person. As the cancer re-
gistry database increases over time it was desirable to
project error rates to larger databases. One step in this
projection was to obtain estimates for the probabilities
h and s where
h = P(pair of records is linked | records pertain to two
different persons ) and
s = P(pair of records is not linked | records pertain to one
person).
The formulae are given in the appendix.
Results
After establishing the gold standard, we found that the
150,000 records pertained to 132,267 persons, for
118,218 persons there was exactly one record, 14,049
persons had more than one record in the sample; this
resulted in 31,782 records having a least one matching
record. So with 34,633 records entering in the clerical
review a proportion of 91.8%was found to havematching
records. None of the 4,000 groups of records with low
weights actually contained any matches. The record
linkage performed by the EKR NRW yielded 132,515
persons of which 13,841 had more than one record.
Hence the net error was 248 cases resulting in 0.19%
overestimation of cases. Table 1 displays the distribution
of multiple records in detail.
Synonym errors and homonym errors
While it is possible that synonym and homonym errors
occur simultaneously, i.e. a record that should be linked
to record(s) of person A is instead linked to record(s) of
person B, this was not observed in this study. The differ-
ences in linkage decisions between the routine in the
EKRNRWand the study are shown in Table 2 and Table 3.
Synonym errors lead to 268 additional cases whereas
20 cases were missed due to homonym errors
Missing a link of two records for one person gave rise to
223 synonyms. Synonym errors were observed for 38
persons with three records; in 37 instances two records
had been linked and the link of the third had beenmissed
(2+1), in one instance three records had been allocated
to three different persons (1+1+1) giving rise to 2 syn-
onyms.
Hence the synonym error rates were
S1=NS/NG=268/132,267=0.2%; i.e. due to synonymerrors
the number of cases was overestimated by 0.2%.
S2=268/14,049=1.91%, i.e. the proportion of synonym
errors among the cases with more than one record was
1.91%. The recall was rec=22,252/22,571=98.59%, i.e.
98.59% of the record pairs that should have been linked,
were indeed linked.
When records of different personswere linked erroneously
one homonym error occurred in 20 cases, i.e. in these
cases a single record or a pair of correctly linked records
was linked to one or more records referring to one differ-
ent person. No more complex homonym errors were
found. The resulting homonym error rate was
H=NH/NG=20/132,267=0.015%, i.e. due to homonym
errors the number of cases was underestimated by
0.015%. The precision was prec=22,252/22,287=
99.84%; i. e. 99.84% of the matches were correct.
From precision and recall the F-measure was computed
as F=0.9921.
Projection of results to a larger registry
Currently approximately 140,000 new cases of cancer
occur in NRW per year. On average 2.65 notifications per
case are received by the cancer registry. Assuming con-
stant incidence and constant notification behavior, after
20 years approximately 7,420,000 notifications are to
be expected.
We estimated the average probability that a homonym
error occurs for an arbitrary pair of records pertaining to
two different persons to be h=3.111*10-9. The homonym
error rate increases linearly with the number of records,
leading to a projected homonym rate of 1.15% in a re-
gistry with 7,420,000 records.
We estimated the probability of an arbitrary pair of records
for one person not to be linked to be s=0.008458. We
projected the synonym error rate to various scenarios for
the distribution of multiple notifications; the results are
given in Table 4.
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Table 1: Linkage results – distribution of multiple records per person
Table 2: Synonym errors
Table 3: Homonym errors
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Table 4: Projection of synonym error rates to various distributions of multiple notifications
In some scenarios we simply assumed that the propor-
tions of cases with more than one record were doubled
or tripled. In other scenarios we assumed that the distri-
bution of the number of records per person followed a
zero-truncated Poisson distribution with parameter λ and
mean μ=λ/(1-exp(-λ)).
Apart from the s estimated from the data, we also project-
ed error rates for the case where s can be halved, e.g. by
introducing more rigorous procedures for standardizing
data entry.
With an increasing proportion of persons with multiple
records the synonym error rate increases. If on average
there are three records per person S1 increases to 2.36%.
If the error probability can be halved and the average
number of notifications is 2.5 S1 will be less than 1.0%.
Discussion
There are only a few studies evaluating the performance
of a record linkage approach based on a sophisticated
process of creating a gold standard for a large database.
Duvall et al. [23] linked data from a health care provider
to the Utah population database. They found a minimum
accuracy of 96.3%. Joffe et al. [24] performed a bench-
mark comparison in which samples of records from a
large clinical data base where de-duplicated. They found
that optimized deterministic record linkage procedures
might be superior to probabilistic record linkage, particu-
larly in the amount of record pairs left for clerical review.
Giersiepen et al. [25] studied the linkage of cancer re-
gistry data, which were encrypted as usual in Germany,
with data from amammography screening program. Their
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procedure to obtain the gold standard was similar to ours.
While they found the F-measure to be 96.7%when record
linkage thresholds were chosen optimally, we obtained
F=99.2%. This is due to the fact that both precision
(99.8% versus 98% ) and recall (98.5% versus 95.9%)
were somewhat higher in the current study than in the
study by Giersiepen et al. [25]. Errors in case numbers
of 1% or less are generally deemed acceptable in a cancer
registry context. Both, the homonym and synonym error
rates observed here (H=0.015% ; S2=1.91%) were
somewhat lower than in a previous study using data of
the Münster cancer registry (H<0.5%, S2=2% [7]). The
previous study was considerably smaller, covering the
Münster area which is only part of the area now covered
by the EKR NRW. Furthermore, only data of patients who
had agreed to be registered were used. This result indi-
cated that care had been taken to improve record linkage
procedures when implementing the new cancer registra-
tion scheme.
The projection to larger databases yielded homonym error
rates close to 1% when the number of records is about
7.5 million, a size of the database that will take approx-
imately 20 years to reach. Most cancer patients die
within 15 years after their diagnosis; patients who died
five or more years before record linkage are excluded
from record linkage. Therefore it is unlikely that more
than 7.5million records are included in any record linkage
and hence the implemented record linkage procedure is
adequate in terms of record linkage errors.
Projection of synonym error rates showed that the syn-
onym rate remained below 1% (in relation to the total
number of cases) while the number of notifications per
case was 1.6 or less. If the number of notifications per
case increases the synonym error rate is more likely to
be around 2% given the current data quality. In order to
obtain synonym rates below 1% even with increasing
numbers of records per case, some improvement regard-
ing the standardization of data entry is indicated.
In the present study, the number and nature of correc-
tions to data from each source of notifications to the re-
gistry was documented. There is a clear relationship
between the quality of the initial data and the number of
synonym errors. Therefore, it is very important to ensure
good quality of data (standardized data input, e.g. using
patient cards, coded diagnosis etc.) in order to obtain
good record linkage quality on the output side, all the
more with encrypted data. The small number of differ-
ences between the gold standard and the results of EKR
NRW shows that a thorough preprocessing was imple-
mented.
This study has some limitations: First, as in many other
record linkage studies, even the gold standard does not
necessarily give the correct linkage decision. Second, this
study did not compare software solutions and it did not
subject the EKR NRW software to a benchmark compar-
ison. While this would be an interesting exercise and
might help the cancer registry to improve its record link-
age performance further, the focus of this investigation
was to evaluate the actual performance of the implement-
ed record linkage procedure. Further, this study did not
investigate errors due to incompleteness, i.e. some cases
of cancer are never reported to the registry. Errors in case
numbers due to incompleteness are typically up to 5% or
10% even in good cancer registries. Compared to the size
of these deficits, the errors in case numbers caused by
record linkage inaccuracy were found to be small. How-
ever, the strength of this study is that a large stratified
random sample of cancer registry data could be analyzed
and that plain text data were available to generate the
gold standard.
Since the inception of the registry privacy-preserving re-
cord linkage using other methods has been studied by
several authors. Schnell et al. and Randall et al. [26],
[27] have shown that privacy preserving record linkage
using Bloom filters gives good record linkage results,
which are even better than those obtained from phonetic
encoding.
Multiparty strategies have been suggested e.g. by Pal et
al. and Kum et al. [28], [29]. However, given the already
complex notification process and the necessity to name
all participating parties in the cancer registration law, an
implementation currently is not feasible.
However, these results may be considered in future re-
finement of registry procedures.
Aminor disadvantage is that only death notifications, but
no death certificates were available. The data quality of
death certificates is not always good and synonym error
rates might be higher if death certificates were included.
With the introduction of the electronic health insurance
card in 2012, every German citizen obtains a unique
lifelong health insurance ID. An amendment to the cancer
registry legislation in North RhineWestphalia was passed
in 2013 [30] that allows to include this ID in encrypted
form in the cancer registry data. The automatic transfer
of ID data from the health insurance card to the registra-
tion system and the use of the health insurance ID will
tremendously reduce the number of record linkage errors.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, North Rhine
Westphalia is the first federal state to include the health
insurance ID in the cancer registry.
Conclusion
While many cancer registries are still – in part or com-
pletely – based on paper notifications, the EKR NRW has
established a notification system that is entirely based
on electronic notification of records, involving also existing
databases like resident registries, hospital information
systems, tumor documentation systems, and alike. The
results of this study show that these techniques are able
to process large amounts of data with very high quality
of record linkage.
The results of this study may be generalized to other
cancer registries using similar record linkage techniques
as well as epidemiological studies linking cohort data to
cancer registries, given that the privacy requirements are
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